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I. INTRODUCTION 
“No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes.  He 
sees it edited by a definite set of customs and institutions 
and ways of thinking.”1 
 
We view the world amidst the mores of our social group; in the 
context of closely-held traditions; with the bent of our own bias; 
and through the shadows of our prejudices.  These cultural 
constructs and social ideologies color our perceptions and shape 
the lens with which we see the world.  The legal system, carried 
forth by human actors, is not immune to these pervasive powers.  
Particularly subject to these value-based judgments are child 
welfare proceedings with substantive and procedural components 
        †  J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2009. 
 1. RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 2 (1934). 
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that are inherently discretionary, often evaluated in light of the 
factual circumstances and needs of the child. 
In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B.2 examines the jurisdictional 
undercurrent in state placement proceedings for an Indian3 child, 
and it serves as a recent example of the consequences produced 
when such beliefs become inappropriately woven into judicial 
institutions. 
For years, state law infused Indian child welfare proceedings 
with white, middle-class standards,4 resulting in a 
disproportionately high number of children removed from their 
homes.5  The Indian Child Welfare Act6 (ICWA) sought, by means 
of the tribal courts, to curb the devastating impact state biases had 
on native tribes.7  Recognizing the irreplaceable resource children 
are to a tribe’s vitality,8 ICWA gave jurisdictional preference to 
tribal courts.9  These venues have a special understanding of the 
nuances of Indian culture often misunderstood by social-service 
agencies,10 and their position within the tribal community provide 
valuable insight into the devastating effects removal has on the 
tribe itself.11 
 2. 724 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2006). 
 3. This case note uses the term “Indian” to maintain continuity with the 
statutory language in its discussion of the Indian Child Welfare Act, and to keep 
with the vernacular used by scholarship in this area. 
 4. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 37 (1989) 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 24 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 
7546) (federal legislation is needed to ensure that “Indian child welfare 
determinations are not based on ‘a white, middle-class standard which, in many 
cases, forecloses placement with [an] Indian family.’”). 
 5. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32 (“Studies undertaken by the Association on 
American Indian Affairs in 1969 and 1974 . . . showed that 25 to 35% of all Indian 
children had been separated from their families and placed in adoptive families, 
foster care, or institutions.”).  See also Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 
1901(4) (2000) [hereinafter ICWA] (discussing the “alarmingly high” instances of 
removal and non-Indian placement); MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN RES., 2007 
TRIBAL/STATE AGREEMENT 1 (Feb. 22, 2007), http://edocs.dhs.state.mn.us/ 
lfserver/Legacy/DHS-5022-ENG [hereinafter MN Tribal Agreement] (“Prior to 
1978, Indian children were being placed in foster care at a nationwide rate ten to 
twenty times that for non-Indian children.”). 
 6. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2000).  
 7. Id. § 1911. 
 8. Id. § 1901(3).  (“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued 
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . . .”). 
 9. Id. § 1911(a). 
 10. See infra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/1
7. BUCHER - ADC 6/11/2008  6:20:42 PM 
2008] IN RE CHILD OF T.T.B. 1431 
 
Gaps in the Act’s language, however, led many courts to resort 
to state law for guidance.12  In the absence of a statutory definition, 
the courts borrowed and applied state-law concepts to construe 
individual terms of the federal statute.13  Yet, such borrowing seems 
fundamentally incongruous with the history and legislative intent 
surrounding ICWA’s enactment—namely, avoidance of the 
documented bias inherent in state law. 
Today, the extent to which state law can influence and 
supplement provisions of ICWA remains unresolved.  In the recent 
decision of In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., the Minnesota Supreme 
Court held that state rules may color ICWA’s “good cause” 
exception in considering the timeliness of a request to remove an 
Indian child welfare proceeding to tribal court.14  This deference to 
state law for an important procedural component warrants 
thoughtful and cautionary reflection on the devastating 
circumstances that gave rise to the need for federal legislation; the 
Act’s emphatically remedial nature; and the consequences a return 
to state law may bring. 
This note first summarizes the history behind ICWA and the 
role of state courts in facilitating the cultural crisis leading to its 
enactment.15  It then reports on the holding of T.T.B.,16 followed by 
an analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s methodology.17  
Finally, the note proposes a solution to the arguably precarious 
expansion of state law in Indian child welfare proceedings that 
decisions like T.T.B. potentially herald.18  Through a de novo 
standard of review, coupled with a lens of interpretive narrowness, 
courts can best safeguard against future discord between state law 
and native tribes in Indian child welfare proceedings by reducing 
the opportunities available for majoritarian influence.19 
 12. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47 (holding 
that “well-settled” state law can aid in interpreting an undefined term). 
 13. See infra Part II.B discussing the Holyfield case and construction of the 
term “domicile.” 
 14. Id. at 307–08. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. See infra Parts IV–VI. 
 19. See infra Parts IV–VI. 
3
Bucher: Civil Procedure: Narrowed Lens, Clearer Focus: Considering the Us
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
7. BUCHER - ADC 6/11/2008  6:20:42 PM 
1432 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
 
II. HISTORY 
The current disconnect concerning the welfare of Indian 
children carries forward dark echoes of a tumultuous past:20 
From the earliest contact with Europeans, the security of 
Indian families has been constantly tested . . . .  Just as 
their connection to the land was seen as an impediment 
to assimilation, which had to be broken through the 
reservation and allotment policies, the close bonds of 
extended Indian families were also deemed obstacles 
which had to be removed. . . .  [T]he integrity of Indian 
families was attacked by social, cultural, and economic 
forces which were intended to break the familial bonds.21 
The near annihilation of native tribes and cultures through 
government policies designed to force assimilation with the Euro-
American majority bore down not only on the more tactile matters 
of land, but also on the intangible essence of Indian families.22 
Most shocking, however, is the number of Indian children 
removed from their homes pursuant to state child welfare policies 
lacking cultural sensitivity to alternative forms of child-rearing.23 
 20. See generally Patrice H. Kunesh, Transcending Frontiers: Indian Child Welfare 
in the United States, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 17 (1996). 
 21. Id. at 22 (recounting the history of federal interference with Indian family 
structures). 
 22. See Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, 
Jurisdiction and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 602–03 (1994) 
(“According to the analysis of a Bureau of Indian Affairs social worker, the family 
welfare branch of the Euro-American legal system might have depleted tribal 
populations because of ‘profound prejudice and discrimination’ as part of a 
deliberate campaign ‘to undermine Indian mores and values,’ just as Euro-
America’s imperialist agenda had undermined Native America’s geographical 
integrity.”). 
 23. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: 
Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 603–04 
(2002) (“Testimony before Congress preceding the enactment of the ICWA 
indicated that state child welfare officials were insensitive to traditional Indian 
approaches to child rearing, in particular the widespread practice of involving 
members of a child’s extended family in significant care giving.  Applying 
majoritarian middle-class values, state workers often construed such practices as 
neglect or even abandonment.”).  See also Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34–35 (1989).  In 1978, Chief Calvin Isaac of the Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians testified before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs and 
Public Lands.  Id. at 32–34.  He observed that 
[o]ne of the most serious failings of the present system is that Indian 
children are removed from the custody of their natural parents by 
nontribal government authorities who have no basis for intelligently 
evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/1
7. BUCHER - ADC 6/11/2008  6:20:42 PM 
2008] IN RE CHILD OF T.T.B. 1433 
 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, between twenty-five and 
thirty-five percent of all Indian children nationwide were 
separated from their families and living in an adoptive 
family, foster care, or an institution.  Approximately 
eighty-five percent of these Indian children were placed 
with non-Indian families.  Two studies concluded that 
Indian children were placed in foster care five times more 
often than non-Indian children.24 
Statistics lay bare Minnesota’s own contribution to the crisis, 
finding “one in eight Indian children under the age of 18 was in an 
adoptive home, and during the year 1971–1972 nearly one in four 
infants under one year of age was placed for adoption.”25 
A. The Indian Child Welfare Act 
In 1978, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act,26 
responding to the unnervingly high number of Indian children 
removed from their families by non-tribal social service agencies 
and placed in non-Indian homes and institutions.27  By its 
enactment, Congress “attempted to educate the Anglo-American 
judicial system on issues of Indian culture when dealing with Indian 
child custody matters.”28 
and childrearing.  Many of the individuals who decide the fate of our 
children are at best ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst 
contemptful [sic] of the Indian way and convinced that removal, usually 
to a non-Indian household or institution, can only benefit an Indian 
child. 
Id. at 34–35 (citation omitted).  High instances of poverty and alcoholism were 
also frequently used to justify removal.  Atwood, supra, at 604.  Cf. MN Tribal 
Agreement, supra note 5, at 4 (“recogniz[ing] that the necessary understanding of 
an individual tribe’s history, religion, values, mores, and child-rearing practices is 
best obtained from each tribe”). 
 24. Peter K. Wahl, Little Power to Help Brenda? A Defense of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act and Its Continued Implementation in Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
811, 818 (2000) (citing Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
on Indian Affairs of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 15 (1974); 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531).  See 
also supra note 5. 
 25. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32. 
 26. ICWA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2000). 
 27. Id. § 1901(4).  See also Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 32; Carriere, supra note 22, at 
600 (“Congress recognized that state social welfare systems, influenced by the 
cultural bias that informed assimilationist policies, removed Native American 
children from their families and tribes in extraordinary numbers.”). 
 28. Wahl, supra note 24, at 820. 
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ICWA recognized Congress’ role in preserving native tribes 
and the parasitic effect state removal proceedings had on the 
tribes’ sustainability.29  As a result, individual tribes received a 
substantial interest in child welfare proceedings, nearly akin to the 
child’s parents, under the Act.30 
Yet, ICWA conferred more power on the tribe than simply that 
of a weighted intervening party.  The Act articulated a federal 
preference for Indian child welfare proceedings to be handled 
through the child’s tribal court.31  “It is precisely in recognition of 
this relationship [between the tribe and its children] . . . that ICWA 
designates the tribal court . . . for the determination of custody and 
adoption matters for reservation-domiciled Indian children, and 
the preferred forum for nondomiciliary Indian children.”32  
Furthermore, ICWA also tacitly acknowledged the corrosive effect 
continuous state interference had on tribal sovereignty.33 
In essence, ICWA’s power resonates from procedural 
mechanisms favoring tribe involvement in order to prevent further 
disruption of Indian families.34  Two aspects of the Act are 
particularly powerful: (1) notice to the tribe of the proceeding 
coupled with rights of intervention, and (2) a presumption of tribal 
jurisdiction.35  As one commentator noted, ICWA “recognize[s] 
that tribes have a serious stake in the welfare of their children and 
empower[s] those tribes with expansive jurisdiction over Indian 
 29. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901(2), (5) (“Congress . . . has assumed responsibility 
for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes . . . [and] that the States . . . 
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and 
the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”). 
 30. See In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1986) (“[T]he 
tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct from but on parity with the 
interest of the parents.”). 
 31. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2000). 
 32. Halloway, 732 P.2d. at 969–70.  Cf. MN Tribal Agreement, supra note 5, at 
3 (“The foundation of this Agreement is the acknowledgement that Indian people 
understand that their children are the future of their tribes and vital to their very 
existence.  An Indian child is sacred and close to the creator.”). 
 33. See Halloway, 732 P.2d. at 966 (“The importance of tribal primacy in 
matters of child custody and adoption cannot be minimized, for the ICWA is 
grounded on the premise that tribal self-government is to be fostered and that few 
matters are of more central interest to a tribe seeking to preserve its identity and 
traditions than the determination of who will have the care and custody of its 
children.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 18 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7541)). 
 34. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36–37 (1989). 
 35. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911–12. 
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child custody proceedings in order to prevent further 
discrimination and destruction of tribal and family interests.”36 
Determining proper jurisdiction under the Act was more 
ambiguous, however, when the child was not closely connected to 
the tribe’s reservation.37  Known as “transfer jurisdiction,” a state 
proceeding involving a child not residing within or domiciled on 
the reservation could be transferred to the tribal court upon 
request, absent good cause to the contrary.38  ICWA, however, failed to 
define “good cause.”39 
In 1979, roughly a year after ICWA’s enactment, the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) addressed the issue of “good cause” and 
provided additional interpretive commentary by publishing a set of 
guidelines (the Guidelines) to assist state courts.40  While not 
binding, they “offer some structure to state courts.”41  The 
Guidelines identify four factors for determining whether “good 
cause” exists to deny a jurisdictional transfer, including that “the 
proceeding was at an advanced stage when the petition to transfer 
was received and the petitioner did not file the petition promptly 
after receiving notice of the hearing.”42  Significantly, the 
Guidelines noted that “good cause” was intended “to provide state 
courts with flexibility . . . .”43 
 36. Kunesh, supra note 20, at 18 (summarizing the principles behind ICWA’s 
enactment). 
 37. ICWA § 1911(b). 
 38. Id.  Jurisdiction is transferable provided neither parent objects and the 
tribal court consents to jurisdiction.  Id. 
 39. Id.  See also In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 361 (Minn. 1994) 
(noting that nothing in the language of ICWA itself or its legislative history defines 
“good cause”). 
 40. BIA Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 
Fed. Reg. 67,584–95 (Nov. 26, 1979) [hereinafter The Guidelines]. 
 41. S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d at 361.  See also In re Welfare of S.N.R., 617 N.W.2d 77, 
81 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (“While the BIA Guidelines are not binding on courts, 
unless Congress specifically invests the bureau with the authority to implement 
rules pursuant to the Act, Minnesota appellate courts have consistently utilized the 
Guidelines to answer as a matter of law questions unanswered by the language of 
the ICWA itself.”) (citations omitted). 
 42. The Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67,591.  The Guidelines also cite 
objection by the subject child if twelve years of age or older; undue hardship in 
presenting evidence; and the unavailability of the child’s parents paired with little 
or no contact with the child’s tribe as “good cause” reasons to deny the transfer.  
Id. 
 43. The Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67,584. 
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B. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield 
Over a decade after the Act’s passage, the U.S. Supreme Court 
had the opportunity to weigh in on the provisions of ICWA.  In the 
seminal case of Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,44 the 
Court confronted the extent to which state law could bridge the 
Act’s definitional deficits.  The Court affirmed tribal jurisdiction as 
the paramount feature of ICWA45 and held that Mississippi law 
could not be used to determine the key but undefined term of 
“domicile.”46  The state law definition effectively supplanted tribal 
court jurisdiction in favor of the state court, negating ICWA’s 
express purpose.47 
The situation in Holyfield began when a member of the 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, then living on the tribe’s 
reservation, gave birth to twins 200 miles away from the reservation 
property.48  Immediately after their birth, the mother consented to 
their adoption.49  The Holyfields filed an adoption petition six days 
later,50 and the infants’ adoption was finalized less than a month 
after their birth.51 
When the tribe sought to set aside the adoption, the state trial 
court overruled the motion, finding the tribe had “never obtained 
exclusive jurisdiction over the children.”52  This conclusion was 
based on the mother’s extensive efforts to ensure that the children 
were born far from the reservation and her arrangement for their 
immediate adoption by the Holyfields.53  Furthermore, the court 
also considered that the children had never “resided on or 
physically been on the Choctaw Indian Reservation.”54 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  The acts of one individual 
should not be allowed to circumvent ICWA’s remedial purposes.55  
 44. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 45. Id. at 36 (citing tribal jurisdiction as the mainstay of ICWA). 
 46. See id. at 45–47. 
 47. See id. at 51–53. 
 48. Id. at 37. 
 49. Id. at 37–38. 
 50. Id. at 38. 
 51. Id.  Of note, Mississippi law generally provides a six-month waiting period 
before a final adoption decree is entered.  Id. at 38 n.10.  However, the 
Chancellor, at his or her discretion, may waive this period and immediately enter 
the decree, as occurred here.  Id. 
 52. Id. at 39. 
 53. Id. (citation omitted). 
 54. Id. (citation omitted). 
 55. Id. at 49 (“Tribal jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not meant to be 
8
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Moreover, state law could not be used to displace tribal court 
jurisdiction.56  Congress had spoken: tribal courts were the 
preferred forum for custody proceedings involving Indian 
children.57 
The Supreme Court recounted many of the statistics leading 
up to ICWA’s enactment while simultaneously acknowledging the 
great historical disjoint between state institutions and the needs of 
Indian children.58  Based on such commanding congressional 
findings, the Court emphatically declined to use the state 
construction, as it would undermine congressional intent59 by 
allowing individual tribe members to defeat ICWA’s jurisdictional 
provisions.60  State law should not control ICWA proceedings since 
it was the caustic divide between the state courts and the tribes 
which first necessitated federal legislation.61 
In addition, the Court was troubled by the lack of uniformity 
that would result if each state considered ICWA in light of its own 
laws.62  The Court also worried about the potentially drastic 
measures parties might use to ensure their preferred result, 
essentially forum-shopping among the states.63 
Thus, in its very first ICWA case, the Supreme Court 
resounded the inherent remedial purposes of the Act, refusing to 
permit jurisdictional encroachment by state courts on account of 
language ambiguities. 
defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe, for Congress was 
concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also 
about the impact on the tribes themselves of large numbers of Indian children 
adopted by non-Indians.”). 
 56. See id. at 45 (“[I]t is most improbable that Congress would have intended 
to leave the scope of the statute’s key jurisdictional provision subject to definition 
by state courts as a matter of state law.”). 
 57. See id. at 42 (“In enacting the ICWA Congress confirmed that, in child 
custody proceedings involving Indian children domiciled on the reservation, tribal 
jurisdiction was exclusive as to the States.”); see also id. at 36 (ICWA “creates 
concurrent but presumptively tribal jurisdiction in the case of children not 
domiciled on the reservation . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 58. See id. at 44–45, 50 n.24. 
 59. Id. at 44 (“First, and most fundamentally, the purpose of the ICWA gives 
no reason to believe that Congress intended to rely on state law for the definition 
of a critical term; quite the contrary.”). 
 60. Id. at 52. 
 61. Id.  See also 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2000); supra note 57. 
 62. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 45. 
 63. Id. at 46 (“[D]ifferent rules apply[ing] from time to time to the same 
child . . . cannot be what Congress had in mind.”). 
9
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C. Considering Minnesota 
Minnesota subsequently passed its own legislation reflecting 
the principles and provisions of ICWA.  In 1985, the Minnesota 
Indian Family Preservation Act64 (MIFPA) was enacted.  MIFPA 
“emphasiz[ed] the State’s interest in supporting the preservation of 
the tribal identity of an Indian child and recogniz[ed] tribes as the 
appropriate entities to provide direction to the State as to the best 
interests of tribal children.”65  The struggle continued, however, in 
the juxtaposition between state law and the undefined terms of the 
paramount federal statute. 
The leading Minnesota case of In re Custody of S.E.G.66 further 
examined this interplay in the context of adoptive placement.  In 
S.E.G., the struggle arose from ICWA’s permissive but ambiguous 
“good cause” exception,67 and the extent to which state courts 
could deviate from the Act’s placement preferences via state-law 
principles.68 
S.E.G. involved three Indian children, two of whom were 
deemed to have extraordinary emotional needs.69  Beginning in 
February 1988, two of the children were moved six times, and the 
third child five times, before placement in a non-Indian foster 
home in August 1991.70  Roughly five months later, the children 
were placed in an Indian pre-adoptive home.71  Poor planning, 
however, resulted in the children’s return after just nine days.72 
In October, the children transferred to an Indian foster home, 
but placement lasted less than two months.73  Subsequently, the 
children were placed in the care of a different Indian foster 
home.74  The trial court heard testimony from numerous expert 
and lay witnesses regarding the benefits and challenges of 
continued placement in the Indian foster home versus the pending 
 64. MINN. STAT. §§ 260.751–835 (2006 & Supp. 2007). 
 65. MN Tribal Agreement, supra note 5, at 1. 
 66. 521 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 1994).  
 67. See id. (“At issue is whether the placement preferences provision of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), provides a ‘good cause’ exception . . . .”).  Id. at 
358. 
 68. See id. at 361–63. 
 69. Id. at 360. 
 70. Id. at 359. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 360. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
10
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adoption petition of the former non-Indian foster family.75  The 
court concluded that “the children’s ‘need for permanence’ was an 
extraordinary emotional need and that no suitable [Indian] family 
was available for placement . . . .”76  The adoption petition was 
granted in the best interests of the children.77 
Setting aside the petition, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
found that the state’s “best interests of the child” standard for 
determining placement tended to subvert the intent of ICWA.  The 
standard involved a subjective evaluation generally grounded in 
“values of majority culture.”78  Instead, the court utilized factors 
listed in the Guidelines coupled with a de novo standard of review 
as to whether the factors were properly weighed and considered.79 
Improperly weighed factors were deemed issues of law and 
thus subject to the more stringent standard of de novo review.80  
Considering the testimony presented, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court concluded there was an insufficient basis to determine that 
the children had extraordinary emotional needs that were not 
satisfied in their current Indian foster home.81  “Most of the 
testimony . . . which tended to establish that the children had 
extraordinary physical or emotional needs was not presented by 
qualified expert witnesses.”82  Instead, the experts “tended to show 
that the children were not ready to be adopted and needed to 
stabilize before being placed in an adoptive home and that their 
need for stability was being met in [the home of their Indian foster 
parent].”83  Since the trial court did not have the strong expert 
basis requisite for an “exceptional” non-Indian adoptive placement 
under the Guidelines, the matter was reversed.84 
 75. See id. at 365–66 (“Our decision today is not meant in any way as a 
criticism of the trial court’s handling of the matter.  By contrast, it was because of 
that court’s careful decisions at trial, which lasted six days, and the court’s 
thorough findings of fact and thoughtful memorandum that we were able to 
review this case effectively.”). 
 76. Id. at 360–61. 
 77. See id. at 361, 364. 
 78. Id. at 363 (stating that “[t]he best interests of the child standard, by its 
very nature, requires a subjective evaluation of a multitude of factors, many, if not 
all of which are imbued with the values of majority culture”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 363.  See also infra notes 157–58 and accompanying text. 
 81. Id. at 364–65. 
 82. Id. at 365.   
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 364–66 (failing to find good cause to deviate from ICWA 
preferences in adoptive placement). 
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Together, MIFPA and S.E.G. demonstrate Minnesota’s own 
struggle with the “good cause” exception and its conscientious 
attempts to conduct Indian child welfare proceedings within the 
spirit and letter of ICWA.  Despite these efforts, cases like In re 
Welfare of Child of T.T.B. show “good cause” remains a tenuous and 
unresolved issue under Minnesota law.85 
D. The Dangers of “Good Cause” 
Illustrated in part by Holyfield, S.E.G., and later by T.T.B.,86 case 
law is rife with evidence demonstrating the difficulties courts 
encounter when attempting to apply ICWA’s undefined terms.  
The concept of “good cause” concerning jurisdictional transfers is 
particularly troublesome.87  “[S]tate courts continue to create their 
own definitions for several key terms of the ICWA . . . [including] 
‘good cause’ not to transfer jurisdiction to the tribe . . . .”88  Within 
the four factors set forth in the Guidelines,89 courts have imported 
a variety of judicial devices to determine whether good cause exists 
to deny the transfer, such as forum non conveniens90 and, less 
commonly, a “best interests of the child” analysis.91 
 85. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 86. See supra Parts II.B–II.C and infra Part III. 
 87. See Wahl, supra note 24, at 825 (“Good cause is an ambiguous, continually 
litigated concept.  The only apparent dispositive factor in opposition to transfer is 
the absence of a transferee tribal court.”).  But cf. Atwood, supra note 23, at 644 
(“State courts are sharply divided as to the weight to be given the BIA’s guidelines, 
but the disagreements reflect a more fundamental discord about the appropriate 
role of state judges in making substantive dispositions in Indian child welfare 
proceedings.”). 
 88. Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419, 420 (1998). 
 89. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 90. The doctrine of forum non conveniens provides that “an appropriate 
forum—even though competent under the law—may divest itself of jurisdiction if, 
for the convenience of the litigants and the witnesses, it appears that the action 
should proceed in another forum in which the action might also have been 
properly brought in the first place.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 680 (8th ed. 2004).  
See Metteer, supra note 88, at 440–41 (discussing the possible hardships imposed if 
matters are transferred to tribal court under the standard of forum non 
conveniens).  See also In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) 
(“[L]iberal expansion of the forum non conveniens doctrine would preclude 
transferring jurisdiction to tribal courts except in cases where the child resides on 
or near a reservation. . . .  [This] would be contrary to the Congressional findings 
and goals incorporated into ICWA.”). 
 91. Metteer, supra note 88, at 442–44 (discussing use of the “best interests of 
the child” standard in evaluating motions to transfer jurisdiction).  This approach 
is generally rejected as according too much deference to state courts, which 
12
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Similarly, there is no bright-line test to gauge timeliness under 
the Guidelines to determine whether the proceeding is at an 
advanced stage and if the tribe acted promptly in requesting the 
transfer.92  Evaluated on a case-by-case basis,93 requests to transfer 
jurisdiction have been denied when filed five months after the tribe 
received notice of the proceedings,94 but also granted in situations 
where the request came more than a year after the tribe was 
notified.95  Without clear standards, “good cause” faces repeated 
attack as a legal loophole allowing state courts too much latitude in 
express contradiction to the Act. 
Critiquing the inclusion of “good cause” in the Act’s 
jurisdictional provision, Jeanne Louise Carriere asserts that 
“[section 1911(b)] subjects the value of tribal involvement to Euro-
American appraisal through the proviso that the state court can 
refuse to transfer a case for good cause unspecified in the statute.”96  
Carriere also sharply observes: 
The legislative history identified, as a principal source of 
the Native American child welfare crisis, the cultural one-
directly conflicts with the purposes of ICWA.  See Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 
906 S.W.2d 152, 170 (Tex. App. 1995).  In Yavapai-Apache Tribe, the Texas 
appellate court 
reject[ed] the best interest standard because it is relevant to issues of 
placement, not jurisdiction.  The only issue in cases involving motions to 
transfer is the determination of the proper tribunal to resolve the custody 
issue.  Thus, the question of whether a parent or guardian is abusive, 
neglectful, or otherwise unfit is irrelevant at this point.  For a court to use 
this standard when deciding a purely jurisdictional matter, alters the 
focus of the case, and the issue becomes not what judicial entity should 
decide custody, but the standard by which the decision itself is made.  
The utilization of the best interest standard and fact findings made on 
that basis reflects the Anglo-American legal system's distrust of Indian 
legal competence by its assuming that an Indian determination would be 
detrimental to the child. 
Id. (citations omitted).  Accord Armell, 550 N.E.2d at 1065 (“considerations 
involving the best interests of the child are relevant not to determine jurisdiction but 
to ascertain placement”) (emphasis added). 
 92. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
 93. In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 632 (N.D. 2003) (“Whether a motion for 
transfer jurisdiction is timely is determined on a case-by-case basis . . . .”). 
 94. See Metteer, supra note 88, at 439–40.  See also A.B., 663 N.W.2d at 632–33 
(citing cases in which transfer petitions were considered untimely filed, ranging 
from the morning of trial to after the matter had concluded). 
 95. See Metteer, supra note 88, at 440.  See also infra Part V, discussing In re 
Welfare of Children of R.M.B., 735 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007), which upheld 
a transfer to the tribal court when the request was filed two years after the tribe 
received notice of the proceeding. 
 96. Carriere, supra note 22, at 599.   
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sidedness of state child welfare systems, including state 
courts, coupled with their power to judge Native 
American families by Euro-American standards.  By 
including the language of good cause in section 1911(b), 
Congress in effect allowed entities that had gone on 
record denying a Native American subjectivity to have 
discretion on that issue.97 
Similarly, one scholar aptly describes the “good cause” 
exception as a “statutory battleground for jurisdiction.”98  Another 
calls for its removal in order to “take away any possibility that the 
state courts will variously define [good cause] and make exceptions 
to provisions regarding tribal jurisdiction and the placement of 
Indian children which are the heart of ICWA.”99 
ICWA was specifically enacted to avoid use of state law in 
Indian child welfare proceedings.  The “good cause” statutory 
ambiguity creates a large loophole for courts to easily insert the old 
adages of state law.  Such use threatens to subvert the remedial 
purposes of the statute. 
E. Summary 
In brief, the Indian Child Welfare Act endeavored to reduce 
the staggering number of Indian children removed from their 
homes by state systems whose laws failed to properly account for 
tribal customs and values.  When confronted with the use of state 
law to supplement ICWA’s definitional deficits, courts have 
repeatedly found that such overlap often leads to the very state-
subjective assessment and bias the Act sought to avoid.  To date, the 
“good cause” provision remains particularly vulnerable to 
inconsistent application and state-subjective interpretation. 
III. IN RE WELFARE OF CHILD OF T.T.B. 
In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B.100 chronicles the lengthy 
placement proceedings of an Indian child.  While a typical child 
welfare proceeding already faces a complicated and delicate 
 97. Id. at 648.  See also id. at 610 (“In leaving questions open for Euro-
American courts to answer, Congress entrusted determinations of the substance 
and value of Native American family culture to the state courts that it earlier had 
found to be culturally inadequate to make these determinations.”). 
 98. Atwood, supra note 23, at 612. 
 99. Metteer, supra note 88, at 471. 
 100. 724 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2006). 
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calculus of competing interests, the tenets of ICWA introduce an 
additional set of variables in those cases involving Indian children.  
Congress sought to remove much of this complexity from the realm 
of state law and the historical bias of state courts by establishing a 
jurisdictional preference: such matters ought to be transferred to 
the appropriate tribal court.  The continuing struggle lies, however, 
in the distinct but often overlapping legal spheres these two forums 
share.  As demonstrated by T.T.B. and its progeny,101 the question 
of jurisdiction lies far beyond bright-line rules and absolutes. 
In essence, T.T.B. is a case about balancing: When does a mid-
proceeding transfer from state court to tribal court do greater 
harm through the inevitable procedural delay (and consequently 
belated resolution for the child) than continuing to adjudicate the 
matter in state court, risking the historical bias of state law? 
Child X.T.B. was born in November 2003.102  Although his 
parents both resided in Minnesota, his birth took place in Rhode 
Island.103  X.T.B.’s mother, T.T.B., is a member of the Oglala Sioux 
Tribe.104  His father, G.W., is a member of the Yankton Sioux 
Tribe.105 
X.T.B. was taken into protective custody in Rhode Island 
almost immediately based on active child welfare proceedings in 
Minnesota concerning his half-sibling, A.G.106  Hennepin County 
later filed a separate action concerning X.T.B., requesting either 
termination of T.T.B.’s and G.W.’s parental rights or permanent 
placement with a more suitable guardian.107  The Minnesota district 
 101. See infra Part V. 
 102. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 301. 
 103. Id.  The record indicates A.G.M., the former foster care provider of 
X.T.B.’s mother, id. at 301 n.1, lived in Rhode Island, and X.T.B.’s parents had 
gone to visit her a month prior to X.T.B.’s birth.  Id. at 301.  While X.T.B.’s 
parents initially preferred their child be placed with A.G.M., Rhode Island found 
A.G.M. to be unsuitable, “based in part on [A.G.M.’s] involvement with the 
questionable circumstances that led to [T.T.B.] giving birth in Rhode Island 
instead of Minnesota.”  In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d 799, 803 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 104. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 302. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 301.  In April 2003, child protection proceedings began concerning 
A.G., X.T.B.’s half-sister, daughter of T.T.B. and M.G.  Id. 
 107. Id. at 301–02.  Hennepin County added X.T.B. to the matter involving 
A.G. on November 21, 2003.  Id.  T.T.B. and M.G. later voluntarily terminated 
their parental rights to A.G. and X.T.B. was dismissed from his half-sister’s case.  
Id. at 302 n.3.  On December 31, 2003, the county filed the present action solely 
concerning X.T.B.  Id. at 302.  T.T.B. was a minor at the time of X.T.B.’s birth and 
the record suggests she was diagnosed with depression and post-traumatic stress 
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court subsequently ordered that X.T.B. be placed in protective 
custody, and he was brought to Minnesota in late December 
2003.108  Mother T.T.B., the Oglala Sioux tribe, and the Yankton 
Sioux tribe109 were notified in early January 2004 of the separate 
action, and X.T.B.’s mother and father appeared at an initial 
hearing in mid-February.110 
Early proceedings came in fits and starts.111  A pre-trial hearing 
was set for June 10, 2004, and the trial scheduled for July 22, 
2004.112  A subsequent family group conference failed to reach a 
consensus concerning X.T.B.’s placement, and the district court 
announced deadlines for the exchange of witness and exhibit lists, 
submission of pre-trial motions, and the trial date itself.113  A 
scheduling conflict, however, prompted the court to extend the 
deadline for witness and exhibit lists, as well as for pre-trial 
motions, to July 22, 2004,114 and the ensuing trial was postponed.115  
syndrome.  T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d at 802.  X.T.B.’s father, G.W., allegedly had 
chemical health issues.  Id. 
 108. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 302.  The same day Hennepin County filed an 
amended petition to add X.T.B. to the existing matter involving his half-sister, 
A.G., and the county also moved ex parte to place X.T.B. in protective custody.  Id. 
at 301–02.  As a result, X.T.B. was placed with A.G. under the care of A.G.’s 
paternal grandmother.  Id. at 302. 
 109. Id.  In matters involving foster care placement or termination of parental 
rights, state courts are obligated to notify the child’s tribe(s) of the proceeding 
and the right to intervene.  ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2000). 
 110. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 302.  It is unclear whether father G.W. was served 
with the petition concerning X.T.B.  Id.  He did, however, receive notice of the 
proceeding based on his appearance at the initial hearing held on February 17, 
2004.  See id.  Overall, X.T.B.’s placement proceedings were somewhat delayed 
pending an interstate transfer from Rhode Island, X.T.B.’s birthplace.  Id. at 302 
n.3.  Rhode Island deferred to Minnesota based on the open case involving 
X.T.B.’s half-sister, A.G.  Id. at 302–03. 
 111. The initial admit/deny hearing was held on February 17, 2004.  Id. at 302.  
Mother T.T.B. entered a denial and father G.W. received a continuance until April 
20, 2004, as a result of newly appointed counsel.  Id.  At the hearing on April 20, 
T.T.B. favored transfer of custody to her former informal foster care provider in 
Rhode Island, whereas G.W. considered a potential care arrangement and 
permanent placement of X.T.B. with his mother, B.W.  Id. at 302.  As of April 20, 
G.W. had still not entered a formal denial.  Id. 
 112. Id. at 302–03. 
 113. These dates were originally July 8, 15, and 22, 2004, respectively.  Id. at 
303. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  The district court indicated the new trial date would be set at a later 
time upon agreement of the parties and that the “delay would likely be a matter of 
‘several weeks.’”  Id. 
16
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Hennepin County filed an amended petition on July 16, 2004,116 
and on July 21, G.W. moved for dismissal, “claiming the court 
lacked jurisdiction and disputing grounds for termination of his 
parental rights.”117 
The following day, roughly six months after the proceedings 
began, T.T.B. and G.W. moved to transfer the matter to a tribal 
court.118  On August 12, the district court denied G.W.’s motion to 
dismiss,119 but deferred ruling on the jurisdictional transfer,120 
thereby “allow[ing] the Yankton Sioux tribe additional time to file 
a written acceptance of jurisdiction.”121  It was not until September 
24, 2004, that the Yankton Sioux tribe individually moved to 
transfer jurisdiction,122 despite previous motions by both the 
Yankton and Oglala Sioux tribes to intervene and participate in the 
proceedings.123  The district court subsequently denied the transfer 
request, concluding the “hardship” of the 400-mile distance to the 
tribal court and the advanced nature of the proceedings 
constituted “good cause” under the Guidelines.124  The matter 
remained in state court, and legal custody of X.T.B. was ultimately 
transferred to S.G., X.T.B.’s interim guardian and the paternal 
grandmother of his half-sister.125 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals quickly laid aside the district 
court’s “hardship” finding.126  The participants had neither 
 116. Id.  The petition added additional personal information concerning 
G.W.; supplemented the procedural history dating back to the original petition in 
December 2003; and provided additional grounds for the termination of T.T.B. 
and G.W.’s parental rights.  Id. 
 117. Id.  G.W. also moved to transfer custody to A.G.M. in Rhode Island, now 
agreeing with T.T.B. concerning placement of X.T.B.  Id.  Cf. supra note 112. 
 118. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 303.  X.T.B.’s parents moved to transfer the matter 
to the Yankton Sioux Tribal Court.  Id.  The joint motion came six days after the 
county filed an amended petition to terminate parental rights.  See id. 
 119. Id.  The district court held the county’s petition was sufficient to establish 
a prima facie case.  In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
 120. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 303. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 304. 
 123. See id. at 303 n.4.  The Oglala Sioux Tribe moved to intervene in February 
2004, followed by the Yankton Sioux Tribe in late April 2004.  Id.  Both tribes were 
consulted regarding X.T.B.’s initial placement in the home of his half-sister’s 
paternal grandmother.  Id. at 302.  Each tribe was also invited to attend a family 
group conference.  Id. at 303 n.4. 
 124. T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d at 803.  See also The Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 
67,591 (Nov. 26, 1979). 
 125. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 304. 
 126. See T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d at 806. 
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objected to the transfer because of the distance nor stated it would 
hamper their ability to participate in the proceeding.127  “Without 
evidence of undue hardship, distance alone cannot defeat a 
transfer of jurisdiction to a tribal court.”128  The appellate court 
found the transfer request was properly filed, coming six days after 
the county filed an amended petition to transfer legal custody, and 
was submitted by the pretrial motion deadline.129  Because the 
district court did not indicate that the request was untimely at the 
pretrial hearing, and even allowed the tribe to submit whether it 
would accept jurisdiction, the appellate court reasoned the 
proceedings were not advanced.130  Therefore, good cause to deny 
the transfer did not exist because the tribe’s motion of September 
24 indicated the tribal court would accept jurisdiction.131 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, evaluated the nature 
of the proceedings under a different judicial timeline.  The court 
concluded that the county’s motion merely updated the present 
proceeding.132  These periodic updates are required in juvenile 
placement proceedings and, in this matter, did not substantively 
affect the case.133  Since the transfer request was filed on the same 
day that witness lists, exhibit lists, and other pretrial motions were 
due, the supreme court determined the proceedings had reached 
an advanced stage.134  Additionally, the advanced nature of the 
matter was further evident in the lapse of Minnesota’s six-month 
deadline governing child placement proceedings for children less 
than eight years old.135 
The Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated the district court 
order denying the transfer, emphasizing the lengthy involvement of 
both X.T.B.’s parents and the tribes prior to the transfer requests.136  
Further, while acknowledging the remedial intent of ICWA and the 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.  Cf. supra note 91 and accompanying text regarding use of the 
standard of forum non conveniens. 
 129. T.T.B., 710 N.W.2d at 806. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d 300, 308 (Minn. 2006). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 307–08.  See MINN. STAT. § 260C.201, subdiv. 11(a) (2006) (requiring 
that permanency hearings for children under the age of eight shall commence no 
later than six months after placement). 
 136. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 308–09. 
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preference for tribal court jurisdiction,137 the court concluded the 
flexible nature of the “good cause” provision permitted state rules 
to determine whether the proceedings had reached an advanced 
stage.138  As a result, the drawn-out nature of the case authorized 
the court to find good cause existed to deny the transfer.139 
In contrast, the dissent, authored by Justice Page, questioned 
the majority’s willingness to adopt a more liberal construction of 
“good cause.”  The majority, the dissent argued, espoused 
unwarranted confidence in the ability of state courts to effectuate 
the goals of ICWA, while relying on assertions of substantial 
compliance and progress without corresponding proof.140 
Justice Page observed that such progress has not been shown 
in Minnesota, again emphasizing Minnesota’s significant historical 
role in removal proceedings.141  Absent solid quantitative proof of 
advancement, Justice Page found that the “good cause” exception 
should be interpreted narrowly.  And as “the goals of the ICWA 
appear to be unfulfilled and because, as the court notes, the good-
cause exception . . . may operate as a mechanism for easy 
circumvention of the ICWA,” the exception is inapplicable here.142 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B. precariously skirts the edge of 
presumptive tribal court jurisdiction in child protection 
proceedings involving Indian children not residing within or 
domiciled on reservations.  By evaluating the transfer motion’s 
timeliness according to a state-prescribed timeline,143 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court risks infusing the proceedings with the very state-
law bias ICWA sought to avoid.144 
 137. See id. at 304, 309 (“[W]e must defer to the experience, wisdom, and 
compassion of the . . . tribal courts to fashion an appropriate remedy.”) (citing 
Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 54 (1989) (quoting In re 
Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986))). 
 138. See T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 305, 307–09. 
 139. See id. at 307–08. 
 140. Id. at 310 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id.  See also supra note 5. 
 142. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 143. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 144. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2000); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 
490 U.S. 30, 44–45 (1989) (“It is clear from the very text of the ICWA, not to 
mention its legislative history . . . that Congress was concerned with the rights of 
Indian families and Indian communities vis-à-vis state authorities.”). 
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As pointed out by the dissent, the majority relied rather 
significantly on an observation that most state courts have made 
substantial progress effectuating ICWA.145 
Consider the following: 
A January 1992 study in Hennepin County, Minnesota, 
makes clear that greater attention to ICWA is necessary in 
many areas in order to comply with federal law.  In 
particular, the study revealed that efforts to keep Indian 
children with their families were minimal in forty-eight 
percent of the cases examined.  Also of concern is the 
continued failure of the courts to follow ICWA placement 
preferences once an initial custody determination is 
made.  Finally, the study noted that noncompliance with 
laws respecting cultural heritage is more prevalent with 
Indian child custody proceedings than with any other 
ethnic group.146 
In 2005, a Minnesota Supreme Court study concluded “not 
only that Native American children continue to be 
disproportionately placed out of home, but also that the number of 
such out-of-home placements is increasing.”147  Based on data 
collected during 2000 to 2004,148 the 2005 study speaks to an 
ongoing reverberation of the troublesome bias of earlier decades.  
Given Minnesota’s haunting past, such statistics should command 
significant pause to the use of state law in ICWA cases.149 
 145. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting).  Cf. Carriere, supra note 
22, at 589–90.  Carriere writes: 
The publicly avowed purpose of the ICWA was to end forced 
acculturation of Native American children into Euro-American society by 
recognizing a predominantly tribal jurisdiction over tribal child welfare 
cases.  Close examination of the Act’s application in the area of 
concurrent jurisdiction reveals the limits on the dominant culture’s 
willingness to abandon its own representation of the subordinate culture 
and its control over it. 
Id. 
 146. Wahl, supra note 24, at 836–37. 
 147. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting).  See also Minnesota 
Supreme Court, Minnesota’s Court Performance in Child Protection Cases: A 
Reassessment Under the Federal Court Improvement Program 24 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter 
Reassessment] (finding a general increase in out-of-home placement among 
Indian children between 2000 and 2004). 
 148. Reassessment, supra note 147, at 24. 
 149. But cf. Atwood, supra note 23, at 655.  Atwood suggests that 
[r]ather than blaming state courts for the continuing high rate of 
placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes and institutions, 
reformers might look to the persistence of severe socioeconomic 
problems on Indian reservations and among urban Indian populations.  
20
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While X.T.B.’s placement proceeding appears free from 
outward state bias,150 the present decision threatens a legal 
backslide into times of greater state encroachment by bolstering 
the influence of state law in “good cause” determinations.  Critics 
assert that the “good cause” exception often equips state courts 
with a convenient tool to circumvent ICWA mandates.151  The peril 
in allowing state courts increasing deference regarding “good 
cause” is a return to the dominance of ill-suited state laws in Indian 
child welfare proceedings.  The mechanisms designed to protect 
against state abuse risk dilution through broad common-law 
holdings regarding state law in ICWA proceedings, incipient steps 
of which T.T.B. conceivably represents.152 
One of the ways to guard against state abuse is through a de 
novo standard of review.  An abuse of discretion standard, 
overturning the trial court only on clear error,153 does not promote 
the aims of ICWA in its purest form.  Small encroachments by state 
courts in making discretionary “good cause” determinations go 
largely unnoticed in absence of obvious error, effectively removing 
matters from the preferred jurisdiction of the tribal court. 
Alternatively, the de novo standard allows the reviewing court 
to approach the case anew in light of the applicable law and trial 
record,154 enabling the greatest scrutiny of state court decisions.  
The high incidence of poverty, crime, and substance abuse among Indian 
communities can fundamentally undercut the goals of the ICWA . . . .  
[B]irth parents may choose to place their children with non-Indian 
families and may oppose transfer to tribal courts precisely because of the 
socioeconomic conditions existing on many reservations . . . . 
Id. 
 150. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 309 (“[T]here is nothing in the record to suggest 
that resort to the good-cause exception was done for purposes of undermining 
ICWA. . . . [T]he record reflects much effort on the part of the district court and 
the county to comply with ICWA’s directives.”). 
 151. See Erik W. Aamot-Snapp, When Judicial Flexibility Becomes Abuse of Discretion: 
Eliminating the “Good Cause” Exception in Indian Child Welfare Act Adoptive Placements, 
79 MINN. L. REV. 1167, 1193–95 (1995) (advocating abolishment of the “good 
cause” exception for a “firm presumption [of tribal jurisdiction] . . . absent one of 
several specific exceptions”); Carriere, supra note 22, at 648 (arguing the “good 
cause” exception allows state courts to easily sidestep tribal jurisdiction). 
 152. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 153. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 11 (8th ed. 2004) (defining abuse of discretion 
as “an appellate court’s standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted to be 
grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the evidence.”). 
 154. Id. at 94 (defining de novo review as “an appeal in which the appellate 
court uses the trial court's record but reviews the evidence and law without 
deference to the trial court's rulings”). 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court already endorsed de novo review 
when evaluating the factors weighed by a trial court in construing 
ICWA’s provisions, distinguishing these factors from those findings 
of fact not overturned unless “clearly erroneous.”155  Such careful 
scrutiny comports with Congress’ original intent to rein in state 
influence and is ever mindful of preventing future abuse in Indian 
child welfare proceedings.156 
Although the court utilized the de novo standard in T.T.B.,157 
another step can be made toward hastening the directives Congress 
set forth in ICWA’s prefatory findings.158  To achieve the greatest 
amount of protection, de novo review should be copiously applied 
with a lens of interpretive narrowness,159 construing any inference 
in favor of tribal court jurisdiction and against the state. 
Like so many cases that find themselves the subject of law 
review articles, T.T.B. offers an illustration of competing policy 
arguments rather than a formulaic solution to a complex problem.  
Here, the arguments of a timely resolution and spent resources in 
the state system collided against the lengthy distance and inevitable 
delay should the matter be transferred to the tribal court.  Overtly, 
the historical bias ICWA so fiercely guarded against was not 
apparent.  The decision was not clear-cut and the scales failed to 
substantially favor a particular side.  It was, no doubt, a hard case.160 
These are the situations in which ICWA’s remedial intent 
should tip the scales in favor of tribal court jurisdiction.  The 
Minnesota 2007 Tribal/State Indian Child Welfare Agreement (the 
Agreement) makes an important and well-heeded observation: 
The [State of Minnesota and subscribing Tribes] 
acknowledge that, as sovereigns, they may disagree as to 
 155. See In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 1994) (“We will 
not reverse findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.  ‘Considering improper 
factors’ or ‘improperly weighing certain factors’ are issues of law . . . which we will 
review de novo.”). 
 156. See infra note 184.  Further emphasizing the importance of close scrutiny, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held evidentiary standards in ICWA proceedings 
should be on par with the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of criminal 
matters, noting that “[t]he ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ burden of proof is a clear 
and known standard; indeed, it is the highest burden of proof in our 
jurisprudence and we should be able to apply it here.”  In re Welfare of B.W., 454 
N.W.2d 437, 445 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
 157. T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 307. 
 158. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000). 
 159. See T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 160. See Metteer, supra note 88, at 472 (calling for reform “to insure that the 
‘hard cases’ that have made bad law for nearly two decades do not continue”). 
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the extent of each others’ authority, power, and 
jurisdiction in [child welfare] proceedings.  The parties 
agree, however, that the fundamental purpose of the 
federal and state laws . . . is to secure and to preserve an 
Indian child’s sense of belonging to her or his family and 
Band or Tribe.  They agree that cooperating to combine 
their abilities and resources to provide effective assistance 
to Indian children and their families is the best means to 
reach this shared goal.161 
The Agreement reflects Minnesota’s responsibilities under 
both federal and state law to “protect an Indian child’s sense of 
belonging to family and tribe.”162  Further, carrying out these 
responsibilities “require[s] collaboration with the tribes and the 
use of the guidance, resources and participation of a child’s 
tribe.”163  Through the Agreement, the State of Minnesota and the 
subscribing tribes expressed their intention “to strengthen 
implementation of the letter, spirit and intent” of the statutory 
provisions.164 
Thus, when an appellate court finds itself wedged between 
state law and a jurisdictional transfer that comports with ICWA, the 
de novo standard of review provides the greatest opportunity to 
reconsider the matter in light of ICWA’s remedial intent.165  And a 
lens of interpretive narrowness gives proper acquiescence to the 
expertise of the tribal court.166  Accompanied by a lens of 
interpretive narrowness, de novo review strengthens 
implementation of the letter, intent, and spirit of ICWA and 
accords the necessary deference to the Act’s historical backdrop 
while conscientiously promoting the preference for tribal court 
jurisdiction. 
 161. MN Tribal Agreement, supra note 5, at 4. 
 162. Id. at 3. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 6 (“Minnesota case law has determined that a ‘transfer of 
jurisdiction over Indian child custody matters to tribal authorities is mandated by 
[ICWA] whenever possible.’”) (quoting In re Welfare of B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437, 446 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990)). 
 166. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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V. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS: EVIDENCE OF APPLIED 
INTERPRETIVE NARROWNESS? 
Recent case law suggests a promising shift towards applying 
interpretive narrowness to the “good cause” exception in Indian 
child welfare proceedings.  In July 2007, the matter of In re Welfare 
of Children of R.M.B.167 came before the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals.  The court utilized both the de novo standard of review168 
and, arguably, a lens of interpretive narrowness to find that good 
cause did not exist to deny the tribe’s request to transfer 
jurisdiction,169 despite the advanced nature of the proceedings. 
The children involved in R.M.B. were placed in foster care in 
October 2004170 and were subsequently found to be in need of 
protection or services, known as a CHIPS designation, in 
November.171  The tribe filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to 
the tribal court in September 2006,172 slightly two years after the 
CHIPS adjudication.173  While the appellate court duly noted that 
 167. 735 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 168. Id. at 351 (citing In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d 300, 307 
(Minn. 2006) (“But the application of ICWA to undisputed facts presents a 
question of law, which we review de novo.”)). 
 169. Id. at 354. 
 170. Id. at 349. 
 171. Id.  The “CHIPS” acronym denotes a “child in need of protection or 
services.”  See generally MINN. STAT. § 260C.007, subdiv. 6 (2006) (describing the 
circumstances in which a child may receive a CHIPS designation). 
 172. R.M.B., 735 N.W.2d at 350. 
 173. Evidence in the record suggests 
that the tribe filed its petition in anticipation of the county filing a 
permanent-placement petition.  The timing of the petition to transfer 
jurisdiction is consistent with ICWA’s purpose of maintaining an Indian 
child’s cultural and tribal ties and promoting the “stability of Indian 
tribes and families” . . . which may not have been implicated at an earlier 
stage in the CHIPS proceeding. 
Id. at 354 (citation omitted). 
  In fact, there was some confusion in the district court over whether a 
CHIPS proceeding fell within the types of child welfare proceedings that ICWA 
governed.  The original district court order granting the tribe’s request to transfer 
jurisdiction “includ[ed] a finding that the proceeding is not at an ‘advanced stage’ 
because it ‘continues to be a CHIPS case’ in that neither a petition to terminate 
parental rights nor a petition for permanent placement is pending.”  Id. at 350. 
  The appellate court subsequently ruled that “[w]hen the district court 
concluded that a CHIPS proceeding was not at an advanced stage because neither 
a [petition to terminate parental rights] nor a permanent-placement petition was 
pending, it improperly conflated two proceedings that are distinct under ICWA.”  
Id. at 352.  Instead, the “proper inquiry [was] . . . whether the CHIPS proceeding 
was at an advanced stage.”  Id. 
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“[t]he lapse of time between [the foster-care placement, the CHIPS 
proceeding, and the tribe’s motion] makes evident the strength of 
the argument that the CHIPS proceeding was at an advanced 
stage,”174 it still chose to affirm the district court’s decision to 
transfer jurisdiction.175 
The appellate court ruled that even if the lower court found 
the CHIPS proceeding had reached an advanced stage, this was not 
an absolute prohibition against the tribe’s request to transfer 
jurisdiction.176  “ICWA does not mandate, and the Guidelines do 
not suggest, denial of a petition to transfer jurisdiction even when 
good cause for denial exists.”177  The court emphasized the 
compulsory nature of “shall” in ICWA’s section 1911(b) transfer 
provision,178 juxtaposing it against the permissive “may” present in 
the Guidelines, as to whether the advanced nature of a proceeding 
necessarily forced a finding of good cause and subsequent denial of 
the transfer request.179 
In essence, the appellate court first used the de novo standard 
of review to find the CHIPS proceeding properly within the scope 
of ICWA and then applied a lens of interpretive narrowness.  As a 
result, the court held that the advanced nature of a proceeding, 
despite qualifying as a “good cause” exception, did not expressly bar 
  Thus, confusion as to what type of proceedings fell within ICWA’s 
coverage could easily explain the timing of the tribe’s petition to transfer 
jurisdiction—late in terms of the on-going CHIPS proceeding, but timely in light 
of the impending county action to terminate parental rights—a proceeding clearly 
covered under ICWA.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2000).  Although the county filed a 
petition for permanent placement following the request to transfer jurisdiction, it 
was withdrawn at the November 30, 2006 hearing on the tribe’s petition.  R.M.B., 
735 N.W.2d at 350. 
 174. R.M.B., 735 N.W.2d at 352 n.7. 
 175. Id. at 353. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.  See also In re Welfare of Children of B.W., No. A07–612, 2007 WL 
2417331, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007) (“Appellants’ argument focuses 
exclusively on demonstrating that good cause to deny the transfer exists in this 
case.  But appellants’ premise is flawed . . . .  [ICWA] does not mandate . . . denial 
of a petition to transfer even when good cause for denial exists.”). 
 178. R.M.B., 735 N.W.2d at 353 (“Specifically, ICWA provides that, ‘in the 
absence of good cause to the contrary, [the district court] shall transfer . . . 
jurisdiction [to] the tribe.’”) (modification in original). 
 179. Id. (“Similarly, the BIA guidelines provide that ‘[g]ood cause not to 
transfer the proceeding may exist if . . . [t]he proceeding was at an advanced stage 
when the petition to transfer was received and the petitioner did not file the 
petition promptly after receiving notice of the hearing.’”) (modification in 
original). 
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a transfer to tribal court under the Act; therefore, the matter 
should be transferred. 
Finally, the court also reiterated “that ‘ICWA and Minnesota 
law recognize concurrent but presumptively tribal jurisdiction allowing 
the child’s tribe to intervene “at any point” in the state court 
proceedings.’”180 
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the advanced nature of the 
CHIPS proceeding sufficiently placed the matter within one of 
ICWA’s “good cause” exceptions, the court’s willingness to narrowly 
construe the statute and interpretive Guidelines properly 
effectuated the congressionally-espoused preference for tribal 
court jurisdiction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
ICWA is a remedial statute.  Through its enactment, Congress 
sought to assuage the cultural erosion and abuse of native tribes 
through state systems that were fundamentally incongruent with 
and ignorant of social workings within Indian tribes.181 
The procedural mechanisms of presumptive tribal court 
jurisdiction and intervention recognize a tribe’s critical interest in 
the welfare of its children.182  As In re Welfare of Children of R.M.B. 
demonstrates, methods of construction can help avoid the risk of 
inappropriate “good cause” determinations and facilitate 
resolution of the hard cases like In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B.  
Pairing the de novo standard of review with a lens of interpretive 
narrowness effectively advances the aims of ICWA by critically 
reviewing the application of state law and further championing the 
 180. Id. at 353–54 (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Welfare of Child of 
T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d 300, 305 (Minn. 2006)).  Of note, the appellate court pointed 
out that tribal values may play a role in the timing of a petition to transfer 
jurisdiction: 
[A]lthough good cause to deny a transfer petition may exist if the 
“petition is inexcusably filed when the proceeding is already at an 
advanced stage,” a district court must recognize that “fundamental tribal 
values may guide the timing by a tribe to petition for a transfer” of 
jurisdiction to the tribal court. 
Id. at 354 (quoting MN Tribal Agreement, supra note 5, at 6–7). 
 181. See ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2000); see also Atwood, supra note 23, at 
654 (“The central role of the federal and state governments in the decimation of 
Indian tribes and Indian families is an undisputed historical fact, and the 
continued impact of the policies of termination is starkly evident in the grave 
socioeconomic problems facing many Indian populations today.”). 
 182. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
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overwhelmingly accepted idea that tribal courts are most often the 
best forum for Indian child welfare proceedings.183 
 
 183. See In re Welfare of Child of T.T.B., 724 N.W.2d 300, 309 (Minn. 2006); see 
also In re Welfare of S.N.R., 617 N.W.2d 77, 83 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting The 
Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 
67,591, 67,584–85 (1979) (“The ICWA is to be ‘liberally construed in favor of a 
result that is consistent’ with ‘deferring to tribal judgment’ and furthering 
Congressional purposes in passing the statute.”)); In re Welfare of B.W., 454 
N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (“[I]t is essential to the purposes of the 
ICWA to allow appropriate tribal authorities to determine these matters according 
to tribal law, customs and mores best known to them.  Since . . . state social service 
agencies and state courts are part of the problem, transfer of jurisdiction . . . is 
mandated by the ICWA whenever possible.”). 
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